Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Check for updates

Experimental Effects of a Call-Center Disclaimer Regarding Confidentiality on Callers' Willingness to Make Disclosures Related to Terrorism

Michael J. Williams [a], Jocelyn J. Bélanger [b], John Horgan[a] and William P. Evans[c]

aGlobal Studies Institute, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA; bDepartment of Psychology, New York University - Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; cCollege of Education, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, Nevada, USA

ABSTRACT

Utilizing a sample drawn to represent the general U.S. population, the present study experimentally tested whether a call-center's disclaimer regarding limits to caller confidentiality (i.e., that operators would be required to refer calls to law enforcement if callers were to discuss anyone who was a danger to themselves or others) affected disclosures related to a third party's involvement with terrorist groups, gangs, or such party's commission of assault and/or non-violent crimes.

Disclaimer type did not significantly affect the number of terrorism-related disclosures. Furthermore, it did not significantly affect either the number of gang-related disclosures or reports of assault. However, the law enforcement referral disclaimer/condition reduced the number of disclosures of non-violent crimes that were not directly related to terrorism, gangs, or assault, though its effect accounted for less than one percent of the variance between conditions. Additionally, disclaimer type did not significantly affect willingness to recommend the call-center, nor did that effect vary significantly by age or sex. Implications for the call-center's role in addressing ideologically motivated violence (terrorism, violent extremism), as a form of secondary/targeted prevention, are discussed.

Call-centers, dedicated to countering or preventing ideologically motivated violence, have been established in several countries,[1] and have just begun in the United States.[2] Such call-centers serve to provide callers with information and referrals regarding how to prevent someone (typically a third party, e.g., a friend or loved one) from persisting on a path that callers fear might lead to the commission of ideologically motivated violence.[3]

This is not to confuse such call-centers with those that serve as tip-lines, which take receipt of crime-related information/intelligence from the public, then pass that information to law enforcement. For example, the UK's "Crimestoppers" (also available in the U.S.), is an anonymous crime reporting service that holds as its objective "helping law enforcement to locate criminals and help solve crimes . . . that people can call to pass on information about crime."[4] Indeed, information provided to it is "sent to the relevant

---

authority with the legal responsibility to investigate crimes, make arrests and charge people in order to bring them to justice."[5]

Instead, the call-center paradigm described in this article, and under development in the U.S. (through 2-1-1/United Way), is intended to offer a non-law enforcement avenue, for the public, with respect to preventing their friends and loved ones from committing terrorism or acts of violent extremism. The need for such an avenue is based on empirical findings that the public often would fear contacting law enforcement in such cases: for fear of getting the person of concern, or themselves, "in trouble" with the authorities.[6] Thus, the present call-center paradigm is decidedly not a tip-line, and, thus, not intended to serve an intelligence/law enforcement function. It is, instead, an information and referral resource for those seeking guidance on how to shepherd someone away from pursuing a path that might result in the person of concern engaging in, or otherwise supporting, violent extremism. Indeed, law enforcement are only ever notified, by the call-centers, if callers discuss someone deemed, by operators, to be a danger to themselves or others.[7]

The focus of the 2-1-1 call-centers, with respect to terrorism and other forms of violent extremism, is to prevent so-called homegrown violent extremism.[8] The principle behind their approach to such prevention is based upon the empirically supported finding that friends and loved ones (so-called associate gatekeepers) might be the first to know whether an individual is considering committing an act of terrorism/violent extremism.[9] Indeed, there is good reason to believe in the potential for such an approach, given that related research has shown that, in 64% of the cases, among a sample of 119 lone-actor terrorists, friends or family were aware of the offenders' intent to engage in terrorism-related activities, "because the offender verbally told them."[10] Furthermore, subsequent research has found that, among a sample of 119 solo mass murders, 31% verbalized their intent to family or friends.[11] Therefore, the 2-1-1 call-centers aim to fulfill the need to empower those who are aware of such leaked intent and to help them to intervene before such attacks can occur.

Along the primary-secondary-tertiary spectrum of prevention, the prevention approach of the 2-1-1 call-centers is decidedly a secondary, or "targeted," form of terrorism prevention focused on intervening with those who have been identified as candidates for intervention, who have not yet fully manifested the problem behavior (in the present case, committed terrorism/violent extremism).[12] As such, it is consistent with terrorism prevention strategies that recognize, if not emphasize, the importance of such secondary/targeted approaches to reducing terrorism/ideologically motivated violence.[13] Therefore, the 2-1-1 call-centers serve to address an arguably mission-critical connection point for gatekeepers to intervene in what appears to be the majority of homegrown violent extremism cases, wherein intentions are leaked.[14]

Among the policies and procedures that such call-centers establish is how to involve law enforcement if callers discuss someone deemed a danger to themselves or others. In short, there are limitations—legally mandated for many service-providers—on the extent to which callers' confidentiality can be maintained.[15] However, given that it cannot be assumed that callers are aware of such limitations, the question arises regarding whether or not call-centers ought to provide callers with a disclaimer regarding those limitations.

From a law enforcement perspective, it would be beneficial to obtain and forward information that potentially could prevent acts of ideologically motivated violence. Therefore, insofar as a disclaimer regarding the limits of confidentiality could hinder

the procurement of such information, it would be strategically advantageous to omit such a disclaimer. However, it also is in the interest of call-centers to preserve their good reputations—advanced, at least in principle, by providing a good-faith warning to callers about the limitations of confidentiality. Providing such a disclaimer would offer an element of both procedural transparency and procedural justice—steps toward preventing call-centers from being perceived as underhanded—should law enforcement notification be required.[16]

Furthermore, protecting the good reputation of call-centers is advisable, not only on principle, but because such reputations are also strategically advantageous from a law enforcement perspective insofar as it helps to prevent violence. In short, should call-centers gain poor reputations due to the involvement of law enforcement without fair warning to callers, and should such reputations reduce the volume of calls that could have prevented violence, the lack of a disclaimer regarding the limitations of confidentiality would be counterproductive for violence prevention.

Anecdotally, providing such a disclaimer is believed not to reduce the degree to which callers are forthcoming with respect to disclosing information about third parties' involvement in violent extremism.[17] Therefore, there is at least some expert-based reason to predict that disclaimers regarding limitations to confidentiality might not affect individuals' willingness to disclose such information. Additionally, insofar as disclaimers contribute to call-centers' procedural transparency, and public perceptions thereof, such disclaimers could be expected to remove a prospective barrier to the public's willingness to contact such call-centers.[18] Therefore, there is reason not only to predict, but to hope, that call-center disclaimers regarding limitations to confidentiality would not affect callers' willingness to disclose information that could prevent violence.

Additionally, given that a violence prevention call-center may have broader objectives than preventing violence related to terrorism or other ideologically motivated crimes, it is also relevant to understand whether disclaimers regarding limitations to confidentiality would affect callers' willingness to disclose information related to a third party's involvement with gangs, or such party's commission of assault. Therefore, if a disclaimer related to the limits of confidentiality does not inhibit callers' disclosures regarding such crimes, it would seem that including such a disclaimer would not negatively impact the degree to which call-centers could be of service with respect to gang prevention or other violence-reduction initiatives. Therefore, utilizing a sample drawn to represent the general U.S. population, the present study experimentally tested whether a call-center's disclaimer regarding limits to caller confidentiality (i.e., that operators would be required to refer calls to law enforcement if callers were to discuss anyone who was a danger to themselves or others) affected disclosures related to a third party's involvement with terrorist groups, gangs, or such party's commission of assault and/or non-violent crimes.

Method

Research design

The study employed a two-condition (disclaimer type; law enforcement referral vs. control) between-participants experimental design.

Sample size, power, and precision

To detect small effect sizes ($f = .10$), with conventional power (80%), at the conventional alpha-error probability (5%), given two conditions (per the research design) and two covariates (sex and age), the total estimated sample size (to detect all main effects and interactions) equals 787.[19]

Oppenheimer and colleagues[20] have estimated that between 35% and 45% of participants tend to respond inattentively on laboratory-based computer-administered surveys. Given that the present study was administered not only by computer, but online, and with anonymous participants, a greater amount of inattentive responding was expected. Consequently, the estimated sample size was doubled to no fewer than 1574 participants. That is in keeping with findings by Maniaci and Rogge[21] that inattentive respondents tend to provide data of quality poor enough to obscure tests based upon the generalized linear model (e.g., the present study), including effects of experimental manipulations. In other words, this recruitment strategy was in accord with research that has demonstrated, when participants fail to follow instructions, "noise" in the data tends to increase, and the data's validity tends to decrease.[22] Commensurate with that research, of the obtained sample ($N = 1733$), 34% were excluded for failing two or more of the survey's three embedded inattentive-responding checks and/or were outliers with respect to time spent completing the survey, affording a final sample of 1151.

Participants

Participants were recruited through TurkPrime, compensated with $2 for completing the survey, and were selected to be proportionally representative of the adult U.S. population with respect to age, sex, and ethnicity (i.e., American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black or African American, Latino, and White). The final sample represented the adult U.S. population to the following extent.

Sex
It was slightly, though significantly, more female (i.e., 55% vs. an expected 50.8%; χ^2 [1, $N = 1151$] = 4.19, $p = .04$).

Age
Age groups were categorized as 18–29 ($n = 208$), 30–39 ($n = 168$), 40–49 ($n = 187$), 50–59 ($n = 231$), 60–69 ($n = 192$), and 70–99 ($n = 165$). No given age group significantly differed between observed vs. expected frequencies. However, due in part to the relative improbability of achieving statistical insignificance with calculations that employ a six-category (i.e., six-row) chi-square contingency table, overall, the age of the sample slightly differed from expected $\chi^2(5, N = 1151) = 2.26$, $p = .05$. Those observed vs. expected frequencies, by age group, are displayed in Table 1.

Ethnicity
With one exception, the sample's ethnicities did not significantly differ from U.S. Census data. Specifically, the sample obtained 2.38 times fewer Latinos ($n = 78$) than expected ($n = 184$) χ^2 (2, $N = 1038$) = 33.41, $p < .01$.

Table 1. Observed vs. expected frequencies by age range.

Ages	Observed frequencies	Expected frequencies
18–29	208	253
30–39	168	196
40–49	187	184
50–59	231	207
60–69	192	161
70–99	165	150

Measures and covariates

The measures and covariates used in the present study are those featured in Appendix A, and were of four types. First were 19 items (displayed in random order) adapted from the Illegal Behavior Checklist.[23] That checklist is a self-report questionnaire regarding engagement in illegal activities, one that has been used in several studies.[24] In the present study, alpha/reliability for this scale equaled .96.

Beginning with the adapted question stem "How likely would you be to discuss the following issues, about your friend, with the referral specialist? That your friend…," the checklist continues by encompassing four types of illegal activities: violent crimes against other people (e.g., "assaulted someone with the intent of harming him or her, either with their bare hands or with any kind of object or weapon?"), property crimes (e.g., "shoplifted something worth $25 or more?"), drug crimes (e.g., "sold any type of illegal drug or controlled substance, like prescription drugs, marijuana, crack, or any other kind of drug?"), and status offenses (e.g., "smoked, bought, or tried to buy cigarettes before they were 18?"). Additionally, the checklist was modified to add four items (also displayed in random order) pertinent to terrorism (e.g., "joined a terrorist group?") and four items pertinent to gangs (e.g., "attacked the police, or security forces, on behalf of a gang?"). Response options, on seven-point Likert-type scales, ranged from "Very Unlikely" to "Very Likely." Alphas/reliabilities for those two subsets of questions were .98 (terrorism-related items) and .95 (gang-related items).

Note that the present study was focused only upon the items related to terrorism, gangs, and assault. The other items from the Illegal Behavior Checklist were included both to obfuscate (to participants) the study's focus (to minimize any demand characteristic[25] and/or socially desirable responding[26]) and to serve as a check with respect to acquiescence bias.[27]

The second type of measure was a single item (on a seven-point scale, ranging from "Very Unlikely" to "Very Likely") that asked, "How likely would you be to recommend the call-center to others?" The third type of measures were demographic items regarding age, sex, and ethnicity. The fourth type of measures were three inattentive responding checks, from Maniaci and Rogge.[28] Those checks were spaced approximately at the interquartiles of the survey items.

Procedure

After reading and agreeing to the survey's consent form, participants proceeded to complete the survey items featured in Appendix A. Among those items were the two

experimental components whereby participants were randomly assigned to one of the following two disclaimer conditions.

> Sometimes, people—including friends—do things that are illegal. Thinking about your friends, imagine if you were troubled about their behavior and wanted information, or referrals to organizations, to help that person.

To get such information and referrals, one option is to call or text 2-1-1, which connects you to an anonymous call-center dedicated to providing such information and referrals.

Imagine that you were to call or text the 2-1-1 call-center, and the referral specialist explains that they would be [experimental condition "***required to refer your call to law enforcement***"] [control condition "***unable to refer your call to organizations***"], if the issue you're about to discuss involves either of the following:

(a) Anyone who is a danger to themselves or others, and/or
(b) Physical abuse: such as child or spouse abuse.

Subsequently, participants completed the adapted Illegal Behaviors Checklist. Next, participants were asked "How likely would you be to recommend the call-center to others?" which was followed by the demographic items.

Results

Disclaimer type did not significantly affect the number of terrorism-related disclosures, $F(1, 1147) = .13$, $p = .72$. Furthermore, it did not significantly affect the number of gang-related disclosures $F(1, 1147) = 2.08$, $p = .15$, or reports of assault $F(1, 1147) = 2.25$, $p = .13$. However, the law enforcement referral disclaimer/condition did reduce the number of disclosures for other, non-violent, general crimes $F(1, 1147) = 4.67$, $p = .03$, though its effect accounted for less than one percent of the variance between conditions $\eta_p^2 = .004$.

Additionally, disclaimer type did not significantly affect willingness to recommend the call-center $F(1, 1142) = .33$, $p = 0.57$. Furthermore, none of the aforementioned effects varied significantly by age or sex ($p > .05$).

Discussion

It is welcome news that disclaimer type did not significantly affect the number of terrorism-related, gang-related, or assault disclosures. In short, including such a disclaimer—that call-center operators would be required to refer your call to law enforcement if the issue under discussion were to involve anyone who is a danger to themselves or others—does not seem to affect individuals' willingness to discuss a third party's involvement in those crimes. From a law enforcement perspective, this is beneficial insofar as information can be expected to be forthcoming from callers that potentially could prevent acts of violence, including ideologically motivated violence. This does not imply that all violence-related disclosures made to call-center operators should necessarily be made known to law enforcement, but that—in cases where the

issue under discussion does not involve someone deemed a danger to themselves or others—call-center operators would be in a position to provide potentially helpful information and referrals to callers, based upon information disclosed in those calls.

That also is a welcome finding with respect to preserving the good reputation of call-centers, by providing a good-faith warning to callers about such disclosures, which is a step toward preventing call-centers from being perceived as underhanded should law enforcement notification be required. Furthermore, both of the above outcomes promote the cause of countering or preventing violent extremism. With respect to garnering violence-related disclosures from callers, the violence-prevention application is both self-evident and self-explanatory. With respect to preserving call-centers' good reputations, the violence-prevention application is that—were call-centers to gain poor reputations (due to the involvement of law enforcement without fair warning to callers), the effectiveness of call-centers (for violence prevention) would be diminished to the extent that a poor reputation reduces the volume of incoming calls that could provide information that leads to the prevention of violence. Therefore, call-centers could adopt such a disclaimer, as part of their standard operating procedure, with an evidence-based knowledge that such a policy likely would not run counter to the dual objectives of protecting both public safety and the good reputation of call-centers.

Additionally, given that many call-centers' work has broader crime-reduction objectives than preventing terrorism or other ideologically motivated violence, it is also auspicious that disclaimer type did not significantly affect the number of disclosures related either to gang involvement or those of assault. Therefore, it seems that including a disclosure related to the limits of confidentiality also would not negatively impact the degree to which call-centers could be of service with respect to gang prevention or other violence-prevention initiatives.

At first, the finding that the law enforcement referral disclaimer reduced disclosures for other, non-violent/general crimes might appear troubling. However, aside from the fact that this effect accounted for less than one percent of the variance between conditions, there are (at least) three reasons that this finding also is good news. First, it suggests respondents were not merely forthcoming in making disclosures as a kind of conformity to a prospective demand characteristic of the study, socially desirable responding, or an acquiescence bias. Furthermore, it suggests that respondents tended to be relatively conscientious in their responses, carefully considering their responses rather than carelessly endorsing a given response option for the items. In short, participants do not seem to have merely a) "told us what we wanted to hear," nor b) tried to paint themselves in a favorable light as "upright citizens," who report illegal behaviors of others; furthermore, participants c) were not merely willing to disclose any type of crime-related behaviors, nor did they d) respond carelessly/indiscriminately to the items. Furthermore, such reluctance to disclose non-violent/general crimes is arguably a moot point, insofar as call-centers intended to prevent terrorism or violent extremism are not intended to serve as general crime-reporting hotlines.

Additionally, commensurate with the notion that including a disclosure (i.e., regarding limits to confidentiality) would serve to preserve a call-center's good reputation, it is reassuring that disclosure type did not significantly affect individuals' willingness to recommend the call-center. This is another piece of evidence that call-centers' inclusion of such a disclaimer, as part of their standard operating procedures, would not negatively

impact their good reputation, nor hinder the promotion of their service(s) through word-of-mouth advertising. Finally, it is also advantageous that none of the above findings varied by age or sex. Therefore, adoption of such a disclaimer can be considered a recommended practice for call-centers, regardless of the age or sex of their clientele.

Nevertheless, despite the above advantages of employing a disclaimer regarding limits to confidentiality, call-centers' notification of the prospective involvement of law enforcement might be upsetting to some callers. Therefore, should law enforcement notification become necessary, it should be undertaken with great procedural transparency.[29] Research has shown that high levels of perceived procedural justice are linked to perceptions not only of the fairness but the legitimacy of laws and legal authorities.[30] Therefore, insofar as such legitimacy contributes to call-centers' good reputations, such procedural transparency can be expected to enhance callers' willingness to contact call-centers and, consequently, promote public safety.

As described, the terrorism focus of 2-1-1 call-centers is to prevent homegrown violent extremism. Furthermore, it supports a secondary, or "targeted," form of terrorism prevention, focused on empowering individuals to intervene with those whom they identified as needing intervention and who have not yet committed terrorism or acts of violent extremism. In this way, the 2-1-1 call-centers support terrorism prevention strategies that endorse such secondary/targeted approaches to reducing terrorism and violent extremism.[31]

As mentioned, that approach to its prevention is based upon empirical findings that friends and loved ones might be the first to know whether an individual is considering committing an act of terrorism/violent extremism,[32] but that such associate gatekeepers often would fear contacting law enforcement in such cases.[33] Even if associate gatekeepers are not the very first to know of such intent, as mentioned, research suggests that—in the majority of cases (64%)—they will be made verbally aware, by the person of concern, if that person is intending to commit a terrorist attack.[34] Indeed, even among solo mass murders, research suggests that friends and family would have verbal advance notice, from the attacker, in a large percentage (31%) of the cases.[35] Therefore, there is strong reason to believe that 2-1-1 call-centers can fulfill a need by empowering those who are aware of such leaked intent, and helping them to intervene before such attacks can occur. As such, 2-1-1 call-centers serve to address a crucial connection point for gatekeepers to intervene in what appears to be the majority of homegrown cases of terrorism and violent extremism.[36]

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

ORCID

Michael J. Williams http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5630-9814
Jocelyn J. Bélanger http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3881-0335

Notes on contributors

Michael J. Williams (Georgia State University) has co-led evaluations of programs designed to counter violent extremism: including one in collaboration with the LAPD, and the first evaluation of a U.S. domestic CVE program (funded by the National Institute of Justice, to evaluate components of the "Montgomery County Model" of metro Washington, D.C.). A former National Science Foundation graduate research fellow, and former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), his background includes training, led by the American Evaluation Association, on sustainability evaluation, evaluating coalitions, systems evaluation, and developmental evaluation.
In addition to DHS, Dr. Williams has consulted with White House staff, the U.S. Attorneys' Office, the Australian Attorney-General's Department, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Public Safety Canada regarding design and evaluation of both local and national CVE frameworks. He serves on the editorial board of the journal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, and his own publications include "A utilization-focused guide for conducting terrorism risk reduction program evaluations," and "A social psychological critique of the Saudi terrorism risk reduction initiative." His forthcoming publications include the first college textbook of its kind: "Countering violent extremism: Designing and evaluating evidence-based programs" (Routledge publishers).

Jocelyn J. Bélanger is a professor of psychology at New York University Abu Dhabi. He earned his master's degree and doctorate in Social Psychology from the University of Maryland, College Park. His research focuses on human judgment, self-regulation, and the psychology of terrorism. This interdisciplinary topic has led him to collaborate on several international large-scale projects with the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), examining the motivational underpinnings of radicalization and deradicalization among terrorists located in the Middle-East and South-East Asia. In March 2015, he was appointed by the City of Montreal to establish the first deradicalization center in North America to tackle homegrown terrorism (CPRLV). Dr Bélanger is the recipient of several awards such as the APA Dissertation Research Award and the Guy Bégin Award for the Best Research Paper in Social Psychology. He is also the author of numerous scientific articles published in top-tier journals of his discipline including American Psychologist, Psychological Review, and the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. His research is funded by the Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada as well as the US Department of Homeland Security.

John Horgan is Distinguished University Professor at Georgia State University where he is a faculty member in the Department of Psychology and Global Studies Institute. His books include The Psychology of Terrorism 2nd Edition, published in over a dozen languages worldwide. He serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals, including American Psychologist, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Terrorism and Political Violence. He is a member of the Research Working Group of the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime.

William Evans is a Professor in the Human Development and Family Studies program at the University of Nevada, Reno, and holds joint appointments with Cooperative Extension and with the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Social Psychology. As a developmental scientist and evaluation specialist, he has received over six million in extramural funding to support his research activities, and has authored over 75 peer-reviewed journal articles. He has served on numerous national advisory committees, including the Federal Interagency Working Group on Youth, the Land Grant University National Evaluation Outcome Committee, and the National Advisory Committee of the CDC Suicide Prevention Center. Dr. Evans has provided leadership to several

national evaluation studies, including cluster evaluation projects with randomized multi-level designs.

Notes

1. Waleed Aly, "How to Stop a Lone-Wolf Terrorist? Australia Has a Plan," *New York Times* (2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/opinion/australia-lone-wolf-terrorists-waleed-aly.html; Jocelyn J. Bélanger, "The Rise and Fall of Violent Extremism: The Science behind Community-based Interventions," in *The Motivation-Cognition Interface* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 170–95; see D. Koehler, "Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent Extremism," *Stuttgart: German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies* (2017). http://www.kpebw.de/wp-content/uploads/Handbuch-KPEBW-engl.pdf; see Paul Thomas, Michele Grossman, Shamim Miah, and Kris Christmann, "Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing Information with Authorities Concerning Violent Extremist Activity and Involvement in Foreign Conflict: A UK Replication Study," CREST (2017). https://crestresearch.ac.uk/download/3530/
2. Scott Malone, "For Families of Radicalizing U.S. Youth, a Help Line," *Reuters* (2017). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-help-line/for-families-of-radicalizing-u-s-youth-a-help-line-idUSKBN17F160
3. See Koehler (see note 1); see Thomas et al. (see note 1).
4. "What Is Crimestoppers" (2018). Retrieved from https://crimestoppers-uk.org/about-us/.
5. Ibid.
6. Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans, "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking," *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 45–65. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19434472.2015.1101147
7. Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan, William P. Evans, and Jocelyn J. Bélanger, "Key Points and Principles: Text-Enabled CVE Gatekeeper Intervention Help-Line & Referral System." *Technical report furnished to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security* (Contract: HSHQDC-16-C-B0028) (2017).
8. "Homegrown violent extremists are those who encourage, endorse, condone, justify, or support the commission of a violent criminal act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals by a citizen or long-term resident of a Western country who has rejected Western cultural values, beliefs, and norms. Homegrown violent extremists are a diverse group of individuals that can include U.S.-born citizens, naturalized citizens, green card holders or other long-term residents, foreign students, or illegal immigrants. Regardless of their citizenship status, these individuals intend to commit terrorist acts inside Western countries or against Western interests abroad." U.S. Department of Justice, "Homegrown Violent Extremism," *Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Awareness Brief* (2014). https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0738-pub.pdf
9. Williams et al., "The Critical Role…" (see note 6).
10. p. 429, Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert, "Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 59, no. 2 (2014): 425–35.
11. John G. Horgan, Paul Gill, Noemie Bouhana, James Silver, and Emily Corner, "Across the Universe?: A Comparative Analysis of Violent Behavior and Radicalization across Three Offender Types with Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education," *U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice Reference Service* (2016). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf
12. In contrast, primary prevention focuses on protecting the general population from developing a given problem, and tertiary prevention focuses on the remediation/rehabilitation of a problem among those who have concretely manifested it (in the present case, those who already have perpetrated an illegal act associated with terrorism or violent extremism).

Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans, "Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program" (2016). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf

13. For example, see Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, 4th ed. Commonwealth of Australia (2017). https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/ANZCTC-National-Counter-Terrorism-Plan.PDF; HM Government, "Contest the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism" (2011). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf; HM Government, "Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism" (2015). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf; The White House, "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (2016). https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf

14. Gill et al. (see note 10); Williams et al., "The Critical Role…" (see note 6).

15. e.g., Florida Mental Health Act, Florida Mental Health Act, Fl. Stat. 394.451-394.47891 (2013).

16. Koehler (see note 1).

17. Ibid., personal communication, August 22, 2017.

18. Thomas et al. (see note 1).

19. Franz Faul, Edgar Erdfelder, Axel Buchner, and Albert-Georg Lang, "Statistical Power Analyses Using G* Power 3.1: Tests for Correlation and Regression Analyses," *Behavior Research Methods* 41, no. 4 (2009): 1149–60.

20. Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis, and Nicolas Davidenko, "Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45, no. 4 (2009): 867–72. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009.

21. Michael R. Maniaci and Ronald D. Rogge, "Caring about Carelessness: Participant Inattention and Its Effects on Research," *Journal of Research in Personality* 48 (2014): 61–83. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2013.09.008.

22. Oppenheimer et al. (see note 20).

23. Katrina McCoy, William Fremouw, Elizabeth Tyner, Carl Clegg, Jill Johansson-Love, and Julia Strunk, "Criminal-Thinking Styles and Illegal Behavior among College Students: Validation of the PICTS," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 51, no. 5 (2006): 1174–77. doi:10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00216.

24. e.g., see Stephanie Madon, Max Guyll, Kyle C. Scherr, Sarah Greathouse, and Gary L. Wells. "Temporal Discounting: The Differential Effect of Proximal and Distal Consequences on Confession Decisions," *Law and Human Behavior* 36, no. 1 (2012): 13. doi:10.1007/s10979-011-9267-3.; Ibid.; Laurie L. Ragatz, Ryan J. Anderson, William Fremouw, and Rebecca Schwartz, "Criminal Thinking Patterns, Aggression Styles, and the Psychopathic Traits of Late High School Bullies and Bully-Victims," *Aggressive Behavior* 37, no. 2 (2011): 145–60. doi:10.1002/ab.20377.

25. Demand characteristics are features of a situation that inadvertently suggest to participants how they are expected to respond/answer/behave: in contrast to how they might otherwise, naturally do so. Andrew M. Colman, *A Dictionary of Psychology* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).

26. Social desirable responding is the tendency of respondents to provide answers that they deem more socially acceptable than might be their genuine answers. Paul J. Lavrakas, *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008). doi:10.4135/9781412963947.

27. Acquiescence bias is the tendency for respondents to agree with a questionnaire's statements. Ibid.

28. Maniaci and Rogge (see note 21).

29. Koehler (see note 1).

30. See Tom R. Tyler, "Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule Breaking," *Journal of Social Issues* 62, no. 2 (2006): 307–26. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2006.00452.x.
31. For example, see Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee; HM Government (2011 and 2015); and The White House (see note 13).
32. Williams et al., "Evaluation of a…" (see note 12).
33. Ibid.
34. Gill et al. (see note 10).
35. Horgan et al. (see note 11).
36. Gill et al. (see note 10); Williams et al., "Evaluation of a…" (see note 12).

Appendix A

Survey Items.
Experimental condition
This set of questions is about your feelings toward, and interactions with, your peers. Sometimes, people–including friends–do things that are illegal. Thinking about your friends, imagine if you were troubled about their behavior and wanted information, or referrals to organizations, to help them. To get such information and referrals, one option is to call or text 2-1-1: which connects you to an anonymous call-center dedicated to providing such information and referrals. Imagine that you were to call, or text, the 2-1-1 call-center, and the referral specialist explains that they would be ***required to refer your call to law enforcement***, if the issue you're about to discuss involves either of the following: a. Anyone who is a danger to themselves or others, and/or b. Physical abuse: such as child or spouse abuse. With this information in mind, please answer the next questions.
End of Block
Control condition
This set of questions is about your feelings toward, and interactions with, your peers. Sometimes, people–including friends–do things that are illegal. Thinking about your friends, imagine if you were troubled about their behavior and wanted information, or referrals to organizations, to help them. To get such information and referrals, one option is to call or text 2-1-1: which connects you to an anonymous call-center dedicated to providing such information and referrals. Imagine that you were to call, or text, the 2-1-1 call-center, and the referral specialist explains that they would be ***unable to refer your call to an organization***, if the issue you're about to discuss involves either of the following: a. Anyone who is a danger to themselves or others, and/or b. Physical abuse: such as child or spouse abuse. With this information in mind, please answer the next questions.

How likely would you be to discuss the following issues, about your friend, with the referral specialist? That your friend...

	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Neither Likely nor Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Likely	Very Likely
Shoplifted something worth $25 or more.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Drank, bought, or tried to buy alcohol before they were 21.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Bought or held stolen goods worth $25 or more.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Sold any type of illegal drug or controlled substance, like prescription drugs, marijuana, crack, or any other kind of drug.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Obtained or used any prescription drugs for non-medical purposes (like getting high, staying awake, to have fun).	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Stole property worth $25 or more.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Smoked, bought, or tried to buy cigarettes before they were 18.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Intentionally set fire to destroy property that did not belong to them.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Went joyriding (borrowed someone's car without permission).	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Tried, used or experimented with any illegal drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, crack, LSD, or any other illegal drug.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Vandalized property, like keying a car, slashing a tire, spraying graffiti, or destroying mailboxes.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Assaulted someone with the intent of harming him or her, either with their bare hands or with any kind of object or weapon.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Illegally downloaded music, movies, software, or anything else.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Took credit for someone else's work, ideas, or answers as their own (plagiarism).	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Engaged in a non-violent sex offense such exposing themselves to someone or voyeurism (being a peeping Tom).	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Transported fireworks across state lines.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Trespassed or broke into buildings for fun or to look around.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Hunted or fished without a license.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Drove a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug like marijuana, cocaine, LSD, etc.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Joined a gang.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Contributed money to a gang.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Spent time working for a gang.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Attacked the police, or security forces, on behalf of a gang.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Joined a terrorist group.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Contributed money to a terrorist group.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Spent time working for a terrorist group.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
Attacked the police, or security forces, on behalf of a terrorist group.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.

How likely would you be to recommend the call-center to others?

(1) Very Unlikely
(2) Unlikely
(3) Somewhat Unlikely
(4) Neither Likely nor Unlikely
(5) Somewhat Likely
(6) Likely
(7) Very Likely
(Inattentive responding checks)

I read instructions carefully. To show that you are reading these instructions, please leave this question blank.

(1) Very Unlikely
(2) Unlikely
(3) Somewhat Unlikely
(4) Neither Likely nor Unlikely
(5) Somewhat Likely
(6) Likely
(7) Very Likely

Please skip this question.

(1) Very Unlikely
(2) Unlikely
(3) Somewhat Unlikely
(4) Neither Likely nor Unlikely
(5) Somewhat Likely
(6) Likely
(7) Very Likely

This is a control question. Leave this question blank.

(1) Very Unlikely
(2) Unlikely
(3) Somewhat Unlikely
(4) Neither Likely nor Unlikely
(5) Somewhat Likely
(6) Likely
(7) Very Likely

What is your age?
What is your sex?

(1) Male
(2) Female

How do you describe yourself? Please select all that apply.

(1) American Indian/Native American
(2) Arab
(3) Asian or Pacific Islander
(4) Black/African American
(5) Latino
(6) Persian
(7) White/Caucasian
(8) Other